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Why Have a Theory of Law and Technological
Change?
Lyria Bennett Moses*

I. INTRODUCTION
While at law school, I often found that the most
interesting hypotheticals and research topics were based on
some new (or once new) technology. Examples might be taken
from a range of technologies and doctrinal fields: e-commerce
and contract law, electronic documents and litigation, organ
transplantation and property law, the rise of industry and tort
law, computer hacking and criminal law, and so forth. My
interest in these types of questions is not unique. Over forty
law journals claim to deal with issues of law and technology. 1
While some of these are limited to specific technologies or to
particular areas of law (such as intellectual property), there
are many that are interested in the same spectrum of issues
as myself. Given this scholarly focus, one might expect to find
a group of scholars commenting on “law and technology,” in
the same way as one finds groups of scholars looking at “law
and economics” or “law and literature.”
The study of
technology as such is certainly an important topic within other

© 2007 Lyria Bennett Moses.
* Lyria Bennett Moses, B.Sc. (Hons), LL.B. (UNSW), LL.M. (Columbia)
Lecturer, University of New South Wales; JSD Candidate, Columbia Law
School. The author would like to thank Frank Pasquale, Kieran Tranter,
Gaia Bernstein, Arthur Cockfield, Harold Edgar, Peter Strauss, Bill Sage,
Jennifer Chandler, and Karen Eltis for their insights, as well as the peer
reviewer and faculty and student editors at the Minnesota Journal of Law,
Science and Technology for their helpful comments.
1. Search performed on Washington & Lee Law School’s Law Journal:
Submissions and Rankings website, available at http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/
(last visited Apr. 7, 2007).
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disciplines, including philosophy, history, and sociology. 2
Among legal scholars, however, interest in a general theory of
law and technology is relatively recent. 3
The rationale for a general theory of law and technology,
or a general theory of law and technological change, is not
immediately obvious. 4 Such a topic risks being both too broad
and too narrow. It appears too general because of the
significant differences between technologies—the birth control
pill raises very different legal questions from those raised by
nuclear power. At the same time, it risks reifying technology.
Technology might also be too narrow a focus—efforts might be
more efficiently directed at developing a more general theory,
such as a theory of law and social change. My goal in this
essay is to justify a focus on “law and technological change”
rather than any narrower or broader topic. I begin in Part II
by setting out a definition of technology and technological
change. Part III sets out some of the general observations
that might be made about law and technological change and
the benefits of broadening one’s analysis to look at technology
as a category. Part IV distinguishes a theory of law and
technological change from even broader topics, in particular,
law and changes in knowledge and law and social change.
Part V concludes by setting out some of the potential

2. Journals addressing these issues include: Society for Philosophy and
Technology Quarterly Electronic Journal; Bulletin of Science, Technology and
Society; Technology and Culture.
3. See Gaia Bernstein, Accommodating Technological Innovation:
Identity, Genetic Testing, and the Internet, 57 VAND. L. REV. 965 (2004)
(comparing the impact of genetic testing and the Internet on identity
interests, showing how similar problems arise in different settings); Gaia
Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion: Genetic Discrimination
and Internet Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REV. 243 (2006) (discussing how, where a
technology has a negative impact on social values, certain features of a
technology’s diffusion can create inefficient situations); Arthur Cockfield,
Towards a Theory of Law and Technology, 30 MAN. L.J. 383 (2004)
(evaluating different interpretive responses to technological change); David
Friedman, Does Technology Require New Law?, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
71, 71 (2001); Monroe E. Price, The Newness of New Technology, 22 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1885, 1888 (2001). In the field of international law, see generally
Joseph W. Dellapenna, Law in a Shrinking World: The Interaction of Science
and Technology with International Law, 88 KY. L.J. 809 (1999-2000) and
Colin B. Picker, A View From 40,000 Feet: International Law and the
Invisible Hand of Technology, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 149 (2001). See also
LAURENCE TRIBE, CHANNELING TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LAW (1972).
4. For
discussions,
see
Law
and
Technology
Theory,
http://techtheory.blogspot.com/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2007).
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advantages of theorizing about law and technology.
II. WHAT IS TECHNOGICAL CHANGE?
The term “technology” is not univocal; it has a range of
meanings and has been employed in different ways in
different contexts. Its modern history is quite short. 5 It has
been used to refer to: (1) tools and techniques; (2) organized
systems such as factories; (3) applied science; (4) those
methods that achieve, or are intended to achieve, a particular
goal such as efficiency, the satisfaction of human needs and
wants, or control over the environment; and (5) the study of or
knowledge about such things. 6 The term “technology” thus
sometimes includes what might also be called “technique”;
making organization, bureaucracy, and even law itself into
“technologies.”
Such extended meanings of the term
“technology” are not, however, what law journals focused on
“technology” usually mean by the term. 7 The study of the
“technologies” of corporate organization, government
bureaucracy, and law tend to be left to experts in corporate
law, administrative law, and legal theory (or law and social
theory) respectively. Since locating a single definition of
technology is impossible, this essay will adopt a narrower
focus.
When lawyers claim to be interested in issues
surrounding law and technology, it is usually related to
questions of how the law ought to relate to activities, entities,
and relationships made possible by a new technology. As
technology changes, we can do things, make things, and form
For
connections that were not previously practicable. 8

5. Eric Schatzberg, Technik Comes to America: Changing Meanings of
Technology Before 1930, 47 TECH. & CULTURE 486 (2006).
6. LARRY A. HICKMAN, PHILOSOPHICAL TOOLS FOR TECHNOLOGICAL
CULTURE PUTTING PRAGMATISM TO WORK 11 (2001); CARL MITCHAM,
THINKING THROUGH TECHNOLOGY: THE PATH BETWEEN ENGINEERING AND
PHILOSOPHY 116-17, 150, 160, 308 (1994).
7. There has, however, been some work extending the general critique
of technology, such as, JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (John
Wilkinson trans., Vintage Books 1964) to criticize unduly technical
approaches to law. See also, Franz A. Foltz & Frederick A. Foltz, Technology,
Religion and Justice: The Problems of Disembedded and Disembodied Law,
26 BULL. SCI. TECH. & SOC. 463 (2006).
8. Of course, new forms of conduct made possible by technological
change were always theoretically possible. However, for practical purposes,
they were only available after the relevant technological change.
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example, the development of in vitro fertilization meant that: 9
• Biologically infertile couples could bear and raise a
genetically related child;
• There was a new field of activity, providing in vitro
services, that could be carried out in various ways;
• An existing entity (the embryo) was moved to a
new location, creating the possibility of additional
tests and manipulations.
As further illustration, one topic, rail transportation, gave
rise to very different potentialities:
• The possibility of transport by rail gave rise to an
incentive to build tracks across land belonging to
another.
• The possibility also created a new field of activity,
running a railroad network, which required
significant investments of capital as well as
centralized organization.
• In the construction of railroads, new “things” were
manufactured and used, including trains,
carriages, and their components (brakes, couplers,
etc.).
• Once constructed, railroads enabled (relatively)
rapid transportation by land but only along fixed
routes.
• The operation of railroads created the potential for
new types of accidents (such as collisions of trains
with pedestrians, vehicles, employees, and
animals) and increased the extent of other harms
(such as environmental damage).
A definition that focuses on the relationship between
technological change and new forms of conduct was offered by
David Schön in 1967. Schön defines technology as “any tool or
technique, any product or process, any physical equipment or
method of doing or making, by which human capability is
extended.” 10 This essay concentrates on technology as being
that which overcomes physical, as opposed to legal, normative
or self-imposed constraint.
9. Lyria Bennett Moses, Legal Responses to Technological Change: The
Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 505, 514-15
(2005).
10. DONALD SCHÖN, TECHNOLOGY AND CHANGE 1 (1967); see also
LANGDON WINNER, AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGY 98, 178-79 (1977).
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The very different technologies of in vitro fertilization and
railroad transportation can be used to illustrate the
relationship between increases in human capacity and legal
dilemmas. 11 For example, in the case of assisted reproduction
(including in vitro fertilization): 12
• There was a perceived need to either prohibit in
vitro fertilization, or at least to regulate it, in order
to respond to health, safety, and social concerns.
• It was uncertain whether in vitro embryos would
be treated as persons, property, or something else.
• In most jurisdictions, there was no criminal
penalty for “stealing” embryos, which could not be
treated as property having a fixed value.
• At least one case had held that a woman using the
sperm of a man who was not her husband for the
purposes of assisted reproduction had committed
adultery.
Problems that, at first glance, appear quite different arose
from the introduction of rail travel:
• There was a perceived need to develop special laws
to respond to the physical dangers posed by
railroads. 13
• The need to construct rail tracks confronted legal
uncertainty as to whether an agreement between a
railroad and a landowner permitting the former to
construct and use tracks across the land of the
latter could give rise to a proprietary right. 14
• The obligations generally imposed on common
carriers, such as the requirement that goods be
delivered to consignees on their own premises,
proved impractical for railroads. 15
• The assumption that A’s right to pass through B’s
land was intended to be personal rather than
11. For discussion of a broader range of technologies, see Lyria Bennett
Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep up with Technological
Change, (2007) U. ILL. J.L., TECH. & POL’Y (forthcoming).
12. Bennett Moses, supra note 9, at 522-536.
13. E.g., Federal Safety Appliances Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20301 (1893).
14. Compare Hemmingway v. Fernandes, 13 Simons. 228, 60 E.R. 89
(1842) (covenant to erect a railway across the land of another in exchange for
payment of a toll is proprietary) with Keppell v. Bailey, 2 My. & K. 517, 39
E.R. 1042, 1048 (1834) (covenant to use an existing railway in exchange for
payment of a toll not proprietary).
15. JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 182 (2001).
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proprietary unless A owned property nearby made
little sense where A was a railroad company,
rendering the general rule against easements in
gross obsolete. 16
By demonstrating that problems generated by the very
different technologies of assisted reproduction and rail
transportation arise for similar reasons, this essay will
demonstrate the advantages of developing a theory of law and
technological change.
Lawyers tend to break along
technological lines (health lawyers, cyber-lawyers, etc.) or
doctrinal lines (contract lawyers, tort lawyers, etc.). In most
circumstances, a specific focus is important. No single theory
can decide whether regulation is necessary and, if so, in what
form, for every conceivable type of technology. Again, the
birth control pill raises very different issues to those raised by
nuclear power. No theory of law and technology will answer
all legal questions for all technologies. It can, however, offer
those who work in particular areas some useful insights.
III. ZOOMING OUT TO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Although each technological change may have very
different impacts on both law and society, useful observations
can be made at a more general level. The current state of
technology limits, in practice, what actions we can perform,
what objects we can create, and what relationships we can
form. It is thus common for technological change to impact
the law, which limits what actions we may perform, what
objects we may create and use, and what relationships will be
recognized. Before something becomes possible, there is no
need to decide how it is treated under existing legal rules or
whether it ought to be permitted, prohibited, required, or
encouraged. These questions arise (with increasing urgency)
when a new technological development is conceived,
developed, and diffused into society.
Although not every technology generates litigation and
legal scholarship, technological change is often the occasion for
legal problems. Four reasons why legal change might be a
necessary response to technological change are:
1.

New rules. We need to regulate certain new forms of
conduct and new, specially tailored laws are required to do

16. JOHN CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 342 (2d ed.
1975).
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this. In some cases, it may even be appropriate to ban a
particular technology or particular applications of that
technology.
2.

Uncertainty. The law is uncertain as it applies to new
forms of conduct. In other words, it is not clear whether
such conduct is commanded, prohibited, or authorized.
Existing rules need to be clarified.

3.

Scope of rules. Existing rules were not formulated with
new technologies in mind. Thus, some rules in their
current form inappropriately include or exclude new forms
of conduct.

4.

Justification for rules. Some existing rules are explicitly
or implicitly based on a premise that no longer exists, and
are thus no longer justified [or important or costeffective]. 17

The examples of legal problems arising from the
introduction of assisted reproduction and rail transportation
set out in Part II above fit into these four categories. Not
every technology will raise issues in each of the four
categories; some technologies, such as electric can openers,
raise few, if any, legal issues. Nevertheless, as technology
changes, as new entities, activities, and relationships come
into being, there is at least the potential for issues to arise in
the above four categories.
This classification scheme has several useful functions.
Understanding the ways in which legal rules fail to achieve
their purposes in the face of technological change can assist in
improving techniques of legislative drafting. Having a clearer
understanding of how legal problems arise in the face of
technological change can help in creating a legal reform
agenda at an early stage of a technology’s development. In
particular, it helps with advance thinking about the legal
problems that might arise once a new technology diffuses
throughout society.
Ironically, one of the greatest benefits in understanding
the contexts in which technological change generates legal
problems is to avoid exaggerating the dilemmas posed by new
technologies. Over-emphasis on the technological angle in
discussing legal and social problems is evident in various
contexts. James Boyle described how journalists sought his
comment on the “Internet angle” for ordinary crimes that

17. Bennett Moses, supra note 9, at 517.
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happened to involve a website or email. 18 He gives the
example of a murderer using an email to get a victim to turn
up somewhere—one would not emphasize the technological
link had an older technology (say, a telephone) been used.
Similar problems arise in evaluating technology’s impact on
society. For example, it seems more plausible to conclude that
the Internet (on average) causes depression than to say that
conversation, on average, has the same effect (even if,
statistically, that were true). 19 Judges occasionally fall into
the same trap of assuming that because events took place on
the Internet, the law must be different. 20 Despite occasional
statements that some new technology changes everything, 21
legal problems stemming from technological change are
relatively rare and quite specific. Most of the time, a law predating technological change will apply in the new
circumstances without any confusion. For example, traffic
rules continue to apply to cars with electric windows, and no
sane person would seek to challenge these laws as inapplicable
or write an article calling for the law to be clarified. A
Massachusetts court had little difficulty deciding that a name
typed at the end of an email could be a signature, as it was
directly analogous to a typed name at the end of a telegram,
which had already been accepted as a signature in earlier
cases. 22 Suggestions that law is unable to keep up in a race
against technology or that law does not apply to a new
technology such as the Internet overstate the extent of the
Understanding the circumstances in which
problem. 23
technological change does create legal problems highlights the
fact that many legal problems are technology-independent. It
18. James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty and
Hard-Wired Sensors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177 (1997).
19. Sherry Turkle, “Spinning” Technology: What We Are Not Thinking
About When We Are Thinking About Computers, in TECHNOLOGICAL VISIONS:
THE HOPES AND FEARS THAT SHAPE NEW TECHNOLOGIES 19, 22 (Marita
Sturken et al. eds., 2004).
20. E.g., Macquarie Bank v. Berg, 1999 Austl. Def. Rep. 53-035 (Sup. Ct.
N.S. Wales 1999) (refusing to grant an injunction to restrain defamation
because of concerns about variation in defamation laws across jurisdictions).
21. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise
of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) (arguing that new rules
will emerge to govern within cyberspace a wide range of new phenomena that
have no parallel in the non-virtual world).
22. Shattuck v. Klotzbach, 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 360 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2001).
23. See Bennett Moses, supra note 9, at 515-517. Cf. Johnson & Post,
supra note 21 (in relation to the Internet).
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also confirms that, even though problems associated with new
technologies seem new, problems of the same type have arisen
previously in relation to technologies no longer perceived as
“new.” Observing techno-legal debates of the past helps
defuse the hyperbole of such debates in the present. 24
In addition to constructing a broad classification scheme
about the types of legal problems generated by technological
change, it is possible to use a generalized approach to address
some common questions.
Assume, for example, that a
regulatory scheme is proposed to resolve a conflict between a
new technology and certain traditional values. Gaia Bernstein
has employed non-legal theories of technology, namely
theories as to the social shaping of technology and the
diffusion process, to draw some general conclusions about the
optimum timing of regulatory intervention in technology
She suggests that certain indicators of a
design. 25
technology’s diffusion may enhance the urgency of
intervention. At the same time, the relatively slow pace with
which legislatures are able to respond to instabilities
generated by ongoing technological change can make
legislative intervention at an early stage of technological
development undesirable. 26 It is therefore possible to debate
questions as to the best timing and source of regulatory
intervention at a generalized level, and we can learn
something from decisions made with respect to different
technologies in the past.
If law and technology were no more than a series of
discussions about particular legal problems whose only
connection is the fact that they involve a new gadget or
technique, then “law and technology” amounts to no more than

24. Cf. Marita Sturken & Douglas Thomas, Introduction: Technological
Visions and the Rhetoric of the New, in TECHNOLOGICAL VISIONS: THE HOPES
AND FEARS THAT SHAPE NEW TECHNOLOGIES 1, 6 (Marita Sturken et al., eds.,
2004) (arguing the importance of historical framing for understanding the
relatively limited impact of technology on society).
25. Gaia Bernstein, When New Technologies are Still New: Windows of
Opportunity for Privacy Protection, 51 VILL. L. REV. 921 (2006); Gaia
Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion: Genetic Discrimination
and Internet Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REV. 243 (2006); see also Langdon Winner,
Do Artifacts Have Politics, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE (Albert H. Teich
ed., 10th ed. 2006) 50, 57; Wilbur H. Ferry, Must we Rewrite the Constitution
to Control Technology?, SATURDAY REVIEW, Mar. 2, 1968, reprinted in
RICHARD C. DORF, TECHNOLOGY SOCIETY AND MAN 15, 18 (1974).
26. Bennett Moses, supra note 9, at 577-580.
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the law of the horse. 27 If, however, law and technology can be
thought of as a series of related problems that law frequently
confronts in situations where technology changes, then the
focus on law and technology as an area of study is justified.
Recognizing the similarities between problems arising in
different technological contexts creates the possibility of
learning from the consequences of past legal responses to
technological change.
IV. ZOOMING IN ON TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
It is not enough to demonstrate that broadening one’s
perspective to examine the relationship between law and
technological change yields useful insights.
It is also
necessary to prove that one’s focus is not unnecessarily
narrow. Technological change is only one of many motivations
for legal reform. Nothing thus far explains why this Article
could not as easily been written about legal problems arising
from any improvement in human knowledge, or indeed any
social change. This section will argue that there are benefits
to looking at the problem of legal reform from the specific
angle of technological change.
A. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
Technological change is one type of social change. If social
change is a change in what people think and do, technological
change is a change in what they are technically capable of
doing.
The two are closely related.
Philosophers and
sociologists have frequently commented on the extent to which
technology (understood in its broadest sense) pervades our
lives and thinking. 28 Both excitement and fear of technology’s
potential can be seen in our media and popular culture. 29 To
some extent, legal scholars write about technology simply
because it is an object of fascination. 30
27. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse,
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996).
28. E.g., ELLUL, supra note 7; MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND
THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 181-82 (Talcott Parsons trans., Sribner 1958);
Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, in THE QUESTION
CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 3 (William Lovitt trans.,
1977).
29. Kieran Tranter, Terror in the Texts: Technology – Law – Future, 13
LAW & CRITIQUE 75 (2002).
30. See Barton Beebe, Law’s Empire and the Final Frontier: Legalizing
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But our fears about technology’s potential also create a
felt need for control through law.
Where particular
technologies evoke a strong response, as in the case of human
reproductive cloning, society’s concern may lead to a ban. 31
Even where the benefits are felt to outweigh the harms, as in
the case of in vitro fertilization, there is sometimes a felt need
for law to operate as a “limit,” so as to allay public anxiety. 32
The idea of government control of technology is certainly more
popular than the notion of government control over social life
generally. The reasons for prohibiting or regulating new
technologies are to some extent special.
It is not only in the area of regulation that technology
raises unique issues. Technological change has an impact on
existing legal rules—enhancing uncertainty, making them
over-inclusive or under-inclusive, and rendering them
obsolete. Although changes in what people do, as well as
changes in their capacities, have the potential to raise these
same issues, most social change has less of an impact on law
than technological change. Technological change is usually
more difficult to foresee at the time a law is drafted. Of
course, a lawmaker might choose to ignore future possibilities
or seek to suppress them; for example, a lawmaker might wish
to restrict work on Sundays despite the fact that religious
diversity in his society is increasing. A lawmaker might not
have the time to craft laws that can deal with every
hypothetical. Nevertheless, a lawmaker is less likely to be
caught by surprise by mere changes in behavior. The fact that
most behavioral change is gradual, and is often subject to a
counter-trend, means that debates around law and social
change can be distinguished from the reaction to technological
change.
The special relationship between legal problems and
technological change can be seen by examining the timing of
legal problems arising from a combination of technological and
behavioral changes. Changes in techniques of reproduction
the Future in the Early Corpus Juris Spatialis, 108 YALE L.J. 1737 (1999)
(suggesting that “space law” reflected a desire to increase the extent of law’s
empire).
31. See, e.g., CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24185 (West 2006)
(prohibiting human cloning).
32. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN
FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYOLOGY, July 1984, cmnd. 9314; Janet Gallagher,
Embryos, Eggs and Fetuses: Anxiety and the Law, in REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER, MOTHERHOOD AND MEDICINE 139, 147 (Michelle
Stanworth ed., 1987).
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(such as artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization) will
usually be faster than related changes in social attitudes
towards reproduction. 33 Laws may be needed to control a type
of activity (such as human reproductive cloning) well before it
becomes accepted socially, if it ever does.
Other legal
problems, such as uncertainty, over-inclusiveness, and underinclusiveness, are likely to affect early users of a new
technology. In the context of in vitro fertilization, the first
case considering the consequences of harming an embryo arose
from conduct in 1973, about five years before the first child
conceived in vitro was born. 34 Early cases dealing with the
nature of railroads within the law of property and contract
arose well before railroads became a regular means of
transporting persons and goods. 35 The potential for legal
problems from technological change comes before full social
acceptance, diffusion of the technology, and the resulting
social impact. Legal problems associated with technological
change are thus more urgent and more difficult to anticipate
than legal problems associated with social change. Of course,
once a technology becomes widely accepted and used, legal
problems associated with that technology become more
important.
The fact that technological change poses special problems
is reflected in metaphors of the law’s failure to keep up with
technology. 36 While technological change is not as sudden as
might be imagined (it takes time to move a new product or
process from development to invention to innovation to
dissemination), it is usually speedier than social change and
thus prompts more urgent calls for the law to “catch up.”
Judges usually feel more comfortable updating the law in light
of technological change as compared to social change, perhaps
because it is more easily perceived as objective. 37 While some
social changes, such as an outbreak of war or disease, can be
as sudden as technological change, they raise very different

33. See Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies:
A Close Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035 (2002).
34. Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital, No. 74 Civ. 3588, 1978 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14450 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978).
35. See supra note 14.
36. See Bennett Moses, supra note 9, at 515-517.
37. Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, Technological Change and
Doctrinal Persistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress and the
Court, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 976, 1009 (1997).
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(and quite specific) legal issues. These differences make it
worthwhile to consider legal responses to technological change
separately from the broader topic of legal responses to
behavioral change.
Changes in behavior are not the only example of social
change—there are also shifts in social and cultural beliefs and
practices. Although such shifts can create pressure for legal
reform, like behavioral change, they tend to be more gradual.
Attitudes towards legal reform of this type are also different.
The shifts prompted by the women’s and civil rights
movements are reflected in the repeal of discriminatory laws
and the enactment of laws prohibiting certain forms of
discrimination.
However, unlike technological change,
reformers rarely argue that the law had ceased to be good law
because of social change. Instead, they usually argue that the
law was always bad and all that has changed is the social
awareness of how bad it was. For example, few would argue
today that the legal subordination of African-Americans was
ever justified. Legal responses to technological change are not
perceived in the same way. Few would suggest that laws
regulating railroads were desirable before any track was laid,
or that uncertainties regarding the identification of the
mother of a child conceived in vitro needed to be resolved
before the separation of gestational and genetic motherhood
became a technical possibility. Therefore, although changes in
belief, like technological changes, generate reasons to change
the law, the reasons are of a different type. Changes in the
law are rarely justified on the basis of the fact of social change,
but rather on the basis of general principles such as justice
and fairness.
B. LAW AND CHANGES IN KNOWLEDGE
Another way in which a theory of law and technological
change could be broadened would be to include all changes in
social knowledge. Knowing how to achieve particular ends
through technological means is but one type of knowledge.
There are various other forms of social knowledge, including
information about current events and scientific knowledge.
Like technology, social knowledge evolves over time as new
things are learned and outdated or erroneous notions are
discarded. It is therefore arguable that limiting the scope of
inquiry to changes in one type of knowledge (knowledge of
means to extend human capability) is arbitrarily narrow.
Just as technological change can render legal rules
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uncertain, over-inclusive, under-inclusive, or obsolete, so can
acquiring new information. In particular, rules may become
obsolete once it is discovered that they were based on false
assumptions. 38 It is easy to imagine ordinary instructions
that one might wish to retract had one known all the facts.
Some familiar ones include: “drop everything and come here”
addressed to a person holding a baby in the bath, 39 “shut the
door” spoken by a superior who did not see the CEO
approaching, 40 and “buy a packet of curry powder” where the
speaker did not realize that the price had recently escalated
significantly. 41 These examples suggest that there is nothing
special about the legal problems that arise as a result of
technological change—all changes in available information
may create incentives for lawmakers to reform laws.
But there is an important difference between rules based
on outdated technology and rules based on partial ignorance of
circumstances. In formulating legal rules, legislators and
administrators 42 have the option to devote significant
resources to ascertaining the truth of the facts on which the
new rules are based. 43 While they might devote similar
resources to futurist predictions of technological change, such
Therefore,
efforts are unlikely to prove fruitful. 44

38. See Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of
Authorities and the Authority of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION
357, 374 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1997).
39. Anthony
D’Amato,
Can
Legislatures
Constrain
Judicial
Interpretation of Statutes?, 75 VA. L. REV. 561, 569 (1989).
40. Kent Greenawalt, How Law Can be Determinate?, 38 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1990).
41. Alexander, supra note 38, at 376-77.
42. Judges do not “formulate” rules in the same way. The interaction
between judge-made rules and technological change has different features to
the interaction between legislative rules and technological change. See
generally Bennett Moses, supra note 9, at 606-07.
43. See Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the
Problem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 578 (1994) (noting that
legislatures have “substantial staff, funds, time and procedures to devote to
effective information gathering and sorting”). Congress, in particular, can
gather information from lobbyists, congressional and committee staffs,
legislative hearings, and reports of the Congressional Research Service of the
Library of Congress.
44. David E. Nye, Technological Prediction: A Promethean Problem, in
TECHNOLOGICAL VISIONS: THE HOPES AND FEARS THAT SHAPE NEW
TECHNOLOGIES 159, 161 (Marita Sturken et al. eds., 2004) (referring to a
study demonstrating the common failure of technology predictions made by
experts); ALVIN TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 191 (1970) (giving examples of
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technological change is likely to have a more significant
impact on law than acquiring additional information on the
current state of affairs. If Congress was to pass a law based
on mistaken facts, obviously that law could be criticized
accordingly, but laws based on mistakes as to existing
circumstances are relatively rare. Laws based on mistakes as
to existing circumstances also give rise to a different type of
critique—lawmakers that misconstrue the facts might be
thought careless, but lawmakers are not criticized for failing
to anticipate technological change, only for failing to respond
promptly after the change has taken place.
Changes in scientific understandings are, however,
generally considered as difficult to foresee as changes in
technology. Our understanding and perceptions of the natural
world change over time, often in revolutionary ways. 45
Scientific and technological changes are closely related and
For instance,
sometimes hard to differentiate. 46
improvements in our understanding of biology, and in
particular the process of fertilization, facilitated the invention
of in vitro fertilization and other reproductive technologies.
Conversely, most scientific experiments could not take place
without the tools created by technologists. 47
Nevertheless, the types of legal problems that are most
closely related to changes in scientific understanding differ
from the types of legal problems generated by technological
change. Changes in our understanding of the world may alter
policy focus (for example, by altering our understandings of
what causes both advantages and harm); changes in
technology alter what forms of conduct are practicable (thus
changing how we might cause advantages or harm). Scientific
change can shift the meaning and usefulness of categories,
altering the utility of distinctions made in legal rules. 48 In the
dramatic failures of technology prediction); Eugene Volokh, Book Review,
Technology and the Future of Law, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1375, 1375-76 (1995).
45. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996).
46. See Donald MacKenzie & Judy Wacjman, Introductory Essay, in THE
SOCIAL SHAPING OF TECHNOLOGY 1, 9 (Donald MacKenzie & Judy Wacjman
eds., 1st ed. 1985).
47. Id.
48. Mark D Janis & Stephen Smith, Obsolescence in Intellectual Property
Regimes 1,10-11 (Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 05-48, University of
Iowa 2006) (suggesting that plant variety protection is obsolescent as it
distinguishes plant varieties based on phenotype rather than genotype),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=897728; see also David O. Brink, Legal
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case of technological change, the difficulty tends to be the
inclusion or exclusion of a new form of conduct from a
particular category, rather than the coherence of the category
itself.
The distinctions between the nature of legal problems
generated by technological and scientific change are not only
technical, but have important practical implications, as well.
We can talk about technology-neutral rules, meaning either
rules that do not arbitrarily distinguish between different
means of achieving the same outcome or rules that are
resistant to the sorts of problems generated by technological
change. 49 An understanding of the nature of legal problems
that result from technological change can help explain what
technology-neutral drafting involves. Yet one does not hear
demands for scientifically-neutral rules. This is not because
one cannot imagine a rule that failed to differentiate between
scientific possibilities. The rule “do not do anything that
harms the environment,” leaves an interpreter to decide
whether the manufacture of certain substances, thought by
some to promote global warming, would be prohibited. The
reason is rather that scientific neutrality offers less social
benefits than technological neutrality. It is one thing for the
government to say, “here is what we wish to achieve, do so in
any way you can” and for it to remain neutral on knowledge
claims. Technological neutrality seeks to encourage positive
technological change by at least remaining neutral to the
possibility of new ways of achieving the same ends. It is
extremely unlikely that scientific neutrality would lead to
better science. 50 Rules tend to be based on both current
understandings and existing possibilities, but not in the same
way, and not with the same implications.
One final category of knowledge needs to be distinguished
from technology. There are unusual cases where knowledge
Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105,
128-29 (1988) (noting that a rule maker may use broad language but have in
mind a particular example which, due to changes in scientific understanding,
no longer fits into the original category).
49. A search on LexisNexis on June 11, 2006 in the category of U.S. and
Canadian Law Reviews for “technolog! w/2 neutral” found 506 articles, of
which exactly 100 used those terms in a different context. No articles were
found on scientifically neutral rules.
50. In fact, the opposite is more likely the case, as researchers employed
by regulated corporations would be encouraged to reach “desirable”
conclusions.
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changes what is possible in a society, without technological
change. For example, the discovery of a previously unknown
land mass by a group of people makes colonization possible
(provided the means of getting there already exist). Some of
the legal controversies generated by these situations are
similar to those generated by technological change. However,
the creation of a new jurisdiction involves many unique legal
issues, and ought therefore to be considered independently.
Changes in different types of knowledge—technical knowhow, information on events, scientific understanding, and
discovery of new places—generate very different types of legal
issues. Thus the insights gained from a study of legal and
technological change will not necessarily apply more broadly.
V. CONCLUSION
A theory of law and technology can provide useful insights
that assist in examining legal problems surrounding the
introduction of particular technologies. It provides a structure
through which lessons learned from technologies of the past
can help make decisions about how to regulate and adapt to
future technologies. It also provides a vehicle for learning
from the vast literature on technology written by sociologists,
historians, and philosophers. For example, it is commonly
accepted that technology is shaped by social and political
structures. 51 Yet critics of technology often complain about
society’s failure to subject technology to sufficient scrutiny, in
particular, in light of its power to alter social relations and
Although the frequent adoption of
social values. 52
technologies despite negative externalities may support such
theories, the notion of a mindless mass population accepting
technology without thought is often overstated. 53 A deeper
problem is the difficulty in translating popular concerns into

51. See WIEBE E. BIJKER, OF BICYCLES, BAKELITES, AND BULBS:
TOWARDS A THEORY OF SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE (1995); THE SOCIAL
SHAPING OF TECHNOLOGY: HOW THE REFRIGERATOR GOT ITS HUM (D
MacKenzie & J. Wajcman, eds., 2d ed. 1999); Hans K. Klein & Daniel Lee
Kleinman, The Social Construction of Technology: Structural Considerations,
27 SCI., TECH. & HUM. VALUES 28 (2002).
52. Ellen Rose, The Errors of Thamus: An Analysis of Technology
Critique 23 BULL. SCI. TECH. & SOC. 147, 150 (2003) (discussing Jacques
Ellul, Neil Postman, Lewis Mumford, David Noble, and Ursula Franklin).
53. Id. at 151-155; see also Jesper Lassen & Andrew Jamison, Genetic
Technologies Meet the Public: The Discourses of Concern, 31 SCI., TECH. &
HUM. VALUES 8 (2006).
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policy responses. 54 The interaction between a government’s
technological policies (its attempts to regulate and facilitate
new technologies) and the concrete politics of designing
technologies remains poorly understood. 55 The introduction of
lawyers into discourses on technology and society could help
fill this gap.

54. Lassen & Jamison, supra note 53, at 27.
55. See Knut H. Sørensen, Cultural Politics of Technology: Combining
Critical and Constructive Interventions, 29 SCI., TECH. & HUM. VALUES 184,
187 (2004) (noting the distinction between technological policies and politics).

